estimated probability of death each year for males and females of ages 0 to 120. We assume that our couple are an average male (with an implied life expectancy of 17 years, to age 82) and an average female (with an implied life expectancy of 21 years, to age 86).
Some authors (for example, Bengen 1994 , Pye 2000 Booth 2004 ) calculate the probability that wealth will be exhausted over specified horizons, which can be compared to a retiree's life expectancy. However, there is only a small probability that a person's life will exactly match his or her life expectancy. Just as it is better to use a probability distribution for an asset's annual return than to assume that the annual return will equal its historical average, so it is better to use annual mortality probabilities than to assume that everyone with a 20-year life expectancy lives exactly 20 years. Matters are further complicated by the fact that if a husband and wife each have a life expectancy of 20 years, the joint life expectancy is greater than 20 years.
We consequently use the Berkeley Mortality Database to determine each person's mortality probability in each year of the simulation and a random number generator to determine whether this person dies or lives another year.
Financial Resources
Our hypothetical couple has $1 million in financial assets and no income other than what is generated by their assets. Because we specify the withdrawal rate as a fraction of their initial wealth, the results are scalable. That is, the shortfall probability will be the same for a couple with $2 million in initial assets that spends twice as much as our hypothetical couple. Social Security benefits could be introduced by assuming that the couple spends all of its Social Security benefits in addition to the withdrawals from its assets.
We ignore housing, thereby implicitly assuming that the couple doesn't foresee any housing transactions that will affect its financial wealth. Venti and Wise (2001) find that retirees generally do not liquidate their housing equity to finance spending. We also follow the common practice of ignoring taxes (Bengen 1994; Milevsky 1997; Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz 1998) .
Withdrawal Rate
Many people would like to maintain a stable lifestyle, while spending as much as they prudently can without a substantial risk of their wealth falling sufficiently to endanger their spending or their target bequest. Retirement planning models generally assume that annual spending is initially equal to a specified fraction of initial wealth (the "withdrawal rate") and then adjusted each year for inflation (Bengen 1994; Warshawsky 2000; Milevsky, 2001 ). Bengen and Warshawsky recommend a 4% inflation-adjusted withdrawal rate; Milevsky suggests 7.5%, even though his model gives retirees a 10-to-25 percent chance of outliving their money.
Our baseline case considers three scenarios: 3%, 4%, or 5% withdrawal rates, which correspond to annual spending of $30,000, $40,000, or $50,000. In each case, the real value of annual spending is constant until one person dies, after which there is a 50% drop in spending.
Investing
Retirement planning models (for example, Bengen 1994 , Kim and Wong 1997 , Shoven 2000 typically consider two assets-corporate stock and Treasury bonds-and we will too, with the percentage of wealth invested in stocks varying from 0 to 100. The portfolio is rebalanced annually to attain the desired stock-bond allocation.
In principle, investors should use probability distributions for the asset returns that reflect their personal beliefs. For example, many observers, including Campbell, Diamond, and Shoven (2001) ; Carlson, Pelz & Wohar (2002); Ilmanen (2003); and Siegel (1992) , argue that, in comparison to the returns experienced in the twentieth century, future average stock returns are likely to be lower and closer to the average return on Treasury bonds-a projection often described as the shrinking equity premium.
In practice, investment simulation models usually assume that future returns are randomly drawn from either (a) theoretical probability distributions with parameters estimated from historical returns; or (b) the actual distribution of historical returns (for example, Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997; Cooley, Hubbard, and Walz 1998; Pye 2000; Hickman, et al 2001; Marbach 2002) . For illustrative purposes, our baseline case assumes that annual real stock and bond returns are drawn from lognormal distributions with the historical means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient. We also consider draws from overlapping sequences of the historical returns and from probability distributions with independently estimated means and standard deviations.
Shortfall
One way to measure the riskiness of an investment strategy is by the standard deviation of terminal wealth. However, investors typically choose portfolios as if short-term (for example, annual) fluctuations in market value are important and as if they are more concerned about losses than gains-what Benartzi and Thaler (1995) call "myopic loss aversion. One way of handling the asymmetric valuation of gains and losses is with the semivariance (Markowitz 1959) or, equivalently, the downside deviation (Sortino and Price, 1994) , which is the square root of the semi-variance.
Another way to gauge outcomes is by percentiles of the terminal wealth distribution; for example, the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles (Scott 2002) . Other authors (Milevsky and Robinson 2000) measure outcomes by the probability that wealth will be zero before death; that is, a person outlives her wealth. Zero wealth is a retiree's worst-case scenario; they may also be unsettled if their wealth falls to a level that threatens to plunge them into their worst-case scenario or jeopardizes their bequest intentions. Roy (1952) argues that investors think in terms of a minimum acceptable outcome, what he calls the "disaster level." The safety-first strategy is to choose the investment with the smallest probability of going below the disaster level. We define a shortfall as an outcome in which real wealth in any year is 50% less than initial wealth;
we also look at 75% and 100% shortfalls. We assume that investors use the shortfall probability as a measure of risk, but do not necessarily adopt the safety-first strategy by choosing the investment strategy with the smallest shortfall probability.
Results
For n independent simulations, each with a shortfall probability p, the simulation standard error for the sample success proportion is approximately † p(1-p) n One million simulations were used for each of our scenarios, with a maximum standard error of the shortfall probability equal to 0.0005.
For our initial simulations, the annual real stock and bond returns are generated by lognormal probability distributions with means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient estimated from the historical data compiled by Ibbotson and Sinquefield (2003) . Table 1 and Figure 1 show the tradeoff between shortfall probability and median value of real terminal wealth for withdrawal rates of 3%, 4%, and 5%. (The points on the lines in Figure 1 show stock allocations ranging from 0% to 100% in 5% increments.) The shortfall probability on the horizontal axis is the probability that the household will experience a 50% decline in real wealth sometime during their lives; the median value of terminal wealth on the vertical axis is the median real (inflationadjusted) bequest after both persons have died.
In mean-variance analysis, the Markowitz frontier describes the tradeoff offered by efficient portfolios between the expected value and standard deviation of the portfolio return.
Analogously, the data in Table 1 and Figure 1 describe the tradeoff between shortfall probability (risk) and median terminal wealth (return). As with the Markowitz frontier, the leftmost point on the curve is the minimum-risk position and opportunities below this point are dominated by opportunities above the point since, for any given shortfall probability, households prefer higher median terminal wealth. For a 4% withdrawal rate, the minimum shortfall probability (Roy's safety-first portfolio) is with a 53% stock percentage; portfolios with less than a 53% stock percentage are dominated by portfolios with larger stock percentages.
An increasing stock percentage always increases the expected value and variance of terminal wealth; however, starting from a 0% stock position, an increasing stock percentage initially reduces the shortfall probability. If shortfall probability is the relevant measure of risk, then the inclusion of modest amounts of stock in a retiree's portfolio actually reduces risk even though the variance of the portfolio return is increasing. This is because the increase in the portfolio's expected return dominates the increased variability of the return. Once the equity percentage passes the leftmost point on the curve (53% stocks for a 4% withdrawal rate), the increased variability dominates the increased expected return and the shortfall risk begins increasing.
Beyond the minimum-risk portfolio, the household's preferred stock-bond allocation depends on its risk preferences. Figure 2 shows another cut at the tradeoff between shortfall probability and median terminal wealth, with the curves varying between a 2% and 6% withdrawal rate, for 30%, 50%, and 70% stock portfolios. These tradeoffs make it clear that, for any given stock-bond mix, an increase in the withdrawal rate reduces the median value of the bequest and increases the probability of a shortfall.
Using a 4% withdrawal rate, Table 2 and Figure 3 show how increasing the shortfall threshold from 50% to 75% to 100% shifts the tradeoff leftward. The minimum shortfall probability is 0.12 (with 53% stocks) when a shortfall is defined as a 50% drop in wealth, 0.04 (with 52% stocks) when a shortfall is defined as a 75% drop in wealth, and 0.01 (with 51% stocks) when a shortfall is defined as a 100% drop in wealth.
Overlapping and Nonoverlapping Sequences
The analysis so far involves random draws from lognormal probability distributions whose parameters are estimated from the historical data. A popular alternative is to make random draws from the actual historical data. For example, Butler and Domian (2001) , Howe and Mistic (2003) , and Hickman et al, (2001) randomly select historical months (with replacement) to generate returns over horizons of up to 50 years; Siegel (1994) uses overlapping 15-year periods.
There is considerable evidence to support the efficient markets hypothesis that past asset price movements are a poor predictor of future price movements (for example, Jensen 1978;
Fama 1991), though there is also some evidence of mean-reversion and other patterns. (Renshaw 1983; Poterba and Summers 1988) . If the gross returns over a specified interval (such as a year)
are the cumulative product of independent draws from a stable probability distribution, then the central limit theorem implies that this gross return is lognormally distributed. If the commonly used lognormal distribution is, in fact, an accurate representation of the process by which returns are generated, then it may be advantageous to estimate the parameters of this distribution in order to smooth out the inevitable imperfections in an empirical frequency distribution using a relatively small sample. Figures 4 and 5 compare the empirical frequency distribution of the logarithm of the annual gross returns with theoretical lognormal distributions.
On the other hand, if the lognormal distribution misrepresents the return-generating process, then random draws from the historical frequency distribution may be advantageous. For example, observed stock returns are more fat-tailed than the lognormal distribution (Lucas and Klaassen 1998) .
Using a 4% withdrawal rate, Figure 6 compares the results when each year's stock and bond returns are randomly selected from the annual historical data with the results using the estimated lognormal probability distribution. There is a slight deviation for 100% stocks due to the fat lefthand tail in Figure 4 . The relatively slight differences in the results suggests that the lognormal distribution fits the empirical data pretty well. One of the biggest risks investors face is not an unlucky draw from a stable probability distribution, but a substantial change in the probability distribution itself. Suppose, for example, that an investor assumes that annual real stock returns are well described as random draws from a normal probability distribution with a mean of 10% and a standard deviation of 20%. If so, the probability of a loss of more than 30% in any year is 0.02. But now suppose the economic environment changes so that, for an extended period of time, real stock returns are random draws from a normal probability distribution with a mean of 5% and a standard deviation of 30%. The probability of a loss of more than 30% rises to 0.12.
We illustrate this situation in two ways: by shrinking the equity premium permanently and by allowing the probability distribution to change every 15 years. For the first approach, we assume that annual real stock and bond returns are drawn from lognormal distributions with the historical means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients with one adjustment-the mean stock return is reduced by 3 percentage points, thereby reducing the equity premium by 3 percentage points. Figure 8 compares the tradeoff using this reduced equity premium with the tradeoff using the unadjusted historical data. The 3-percentage-point drop in the equity premium drastically reduces the median value of terminal wealth and increases the shortfall probability for portfolios with substantial stock holdings. However, the minimum-risk portfolio only changes by a modest amount, from 53% stocks to 40% stocks.
For our second illustration of a changed probability distribution, we randomly separated the historical data into nonoverlapping 15-year sequences. One randomly selected sequence is used to estimate the mean returns for stocks and bonds; a second sequence is used to estimate the standard deviations and correlation coefficient. These parameters remain in effect for 15 years in that, for 15 years of the simulation the annual returns are drawn from lognormal distributions with these parameters. After 15 years, new 15-year sequences are selected to yield new values for the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient. Figure 9 compares the tradeoff for this scenario with that for the original scenario of annual draws from stable lognormal distributions with means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient estimated from the complete set of historical data. As shown, the tradeoff is substantially less favorable when the means and standard deviations can change abruptly. But, again, there is relatively little change in the minimum-risk portfolio, from 53% stocks to 60% stocks.
An appealing way to implement this idea of changing probability distributions is with a hierarchical model that specifies a joint probability distribution for the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficient. Every n years, new values of the model's parameters are chosen randomly. We will pursue that approach in future research.
Your Age in Bonds
Samuelson (1963, 1969) and Merton (1969) show that a rational risk-averse investor's optimal bond-stock allocation for a fixed horizon of length T does not depend on the value of T. Samuelson (1994) writes that "it is an exact theorem that investment horizons have no effect on your portfolio proportions." Nonetheless, many financial advisors believe that investors should hold more bonds as they grow older [O'Connell 1995; Greninger, et al 2000; Malkiel 1990 ]. For example, life cycle funds such as Vanguard's Target Retirement Fund grow more conservative as the investor ages by increasing the bond allocation and reducing the stock allocation. Many financial planners use the "your age in bonds" rule; that is 50% bonds at age 50, 60% at age 60, and so on (Canner, Mankiw, and Weil 1997; Booth 2004 ).
Booth argues that the bond proportion should increase as retirement age approaches.
However, his model does not track an individual's decisions over time. Instead, he compares different investors with different horizons, each of whom needs the same target return to meet their goals. Thus, he argues that a person with a one-year horizon who can meet his goals with safe bonds should do so, while a person with a longer horizon who can only meet their goals by including stocks in his portfolio should do that. Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996) investigate three common economic reasons for increasing bond percentages over the life cycle. They find that the only justifiable motive is as part of a portfolio strategy involving stocks, bonds, and future labor income; as people age and future labor income declines, it may be optimal to increase bonds relative to stocks. However, Heaton and Lucas (1997) argue that observed volatility and correlations do not justify the magnitude of observed bond holdings; this apparent underinvestment in stocks is part of a continuing equity-premium mystery. In any case, we are dealing with retirees, for whom changes in future labor income are not an issue and therefore should not affect the optimal bond-stock ratio. Figure 10 shows that the age-in-bonds strategy is outside the tradeoff offered by a fixed stockbond percentage, but not an improvement over a fixed percentage. Looking horizontally, each agein-bonds strategy has a slightly lower shortfall probability than does the corresponding fixedpercent portfolio with the same median bequest. For example, with a 4% withdrawal rate, the age-in-bonds strategy and the 75% bonds strategy both have median terminal wealth of $1.13
million, but the age-in-bonds strategy has a 0.181 shortfall probability and the 75% bonds strategy has a 0.185 shortfall probability. However, looking vertically, each age-in-bonds strategy is dominated by a fixed-percent portfolio with the same shortfall probability. In our example, a 5% bonds strategy has a 0.179 shortfall probability and $2.44 million median bequest.
The fundamental problem with an age-in-bonds strategy for a retired person is that the average bond percentage is inefficiently high, in that more stocks in the portfolio would increase the median bequest while reducing the shortfall probability. The age-in-bonds rule commits anyone past the age of 50 to portfolios that, historically, have been dominated by portfolios with more stocks and fewer bonds.
One way to unleash the age-in-bonds strategy is to modify it to an age-minus-25 or ageminus-35 strategy. With an age-minus-25 strategy, the couple that retires at age 65 begins with a 40% bond portfolio; at age 85, the portfolio is 60% bonds. Figure 11 shows that the age-minus-25 and age-minus-35 strategies are a slight improvement over fixed percentages. For example, with a 4% withdrawal rate, the age-minus-25 strategy has a median bequest of $1.63 million and a shortfall probability of 0.122, while a fixed 48.6% bond strategy has a median bequest of $1.63 million and a shortfall probability of 0.128. Similarly, with a 4% withdrawal rate, the age-minus-35 strategy has a median bequest of $1.84 million and a shortfall probability of 0.126, while a fixed 37.3% bond strategy has a median bequest of $1.84 million and a shortfall probability of 0.131.
While it is technically true that these strategies that increase the bond percentage as one ages have a smaller shortfall probability than do fixed-percent strategies with the same median bequest, the improvements are of negligible importance.
Flexible Spending
Although, ex ante, they prefer a smooth consumption path, retirees ex post may want to adjust their spending as their wealth fluctuates [Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy 2003] . We model this by allowing our hypothetical couple to have a wealth elasticity of spending of 50%; for example, if their real wealth changes by 10% relative to initial wealth, their real spending changes by 5% relative to initial spending. Table 3 and Figure 12 show the tradeoffs in comparison to fixed real spending equal to 4% of initial wealth.
The flexible-spending strategy dominates the fixed 4% withdrawal rate in that, for any given stock-bond portfolio, the flexible spending strategy with the same stock-bond portfolio has a smaller shortfall probability and there is generally a flexible-spending strategy with a different stock-bond portfolio that has a smaller shortfall probability and higher median bequest. For example, a fixed 4% withdrawal with a 50% stock portfolio has a shortfall probability of 0.128 and a median bequest of $1.60 million, while a 50% spending elasticity with a 50% stock portfolio has a shortfall probability of 0.0906 and a median bequest of $1.58 million. A 50% spending elasticity with a 45% stock portfolio has a shortfall probability of 0.0909 and a median bequest of $1.68 million. This reduced shortfall probability and increased median bequest comes at the price of lower consumption when wealth declines. Interestingly, the minimum-rsik portfolio is again approximately 50% stocks.
Discussion
A classic paper by Bengen (1994) looks at retirement portfolios begun in different historical time periods with a constant stock-bond ratio that realize the actual sequence of historical stock and bond returns over the succeeding years. He concludes that a 4% withdrawal rate is safe in that "in no past case has it caused a portfolio to be exhausted before 33 years." In looking at different stock-bond allocations, Bengen concludes that "the 50/50 stock/bond mix appears to be near-optimum for generating the highest minimum portfolio longevity for any withdrawal scheme." However because a 75-25 allocation would have generally increased terminal wealth,
Bengen recommends "a stock allocation as close to 75 percent as possible, and in no cases less than 50 percent."
The past can provide general guidance regarding plausible and implausible asset returns.
However, it is extremely unlikely that the future will replicate the past exactly. If one has definite beliefs about future assets returns, it is sensible to work with an explicit probability distribution that accurately reflects these beliefs. If one is unwilling to specify an explicit probability distribution, then it is sensible to apply a sensitivity analysis by examining a variety of plausible scenarios that are similar, but not necessarily identical, to the historical data.
For a given withdrawal rate, one can determine the tradeoff between shortfall probability and the median value of terminal wealth offered by various asset-allocation strategies. Using this framework, one can then choose a withdrawal rate and asset-allocation strategy that yields the preferred combination of shortfall probability and median bequest. We find that an 50/50 stockbond mix is a remarkably robust rule for (approximately) minimizing shortfall risk in that the minimum-risk portfolio is generally 40% to 60% stocks. A household may be willing to choose portfolios that are more heavily invested in stocks, thereby accepting an increased shortfall 13 probability in return for higher median terminal wealth; however, portfolios less heavily invested in stocks are inefficient in that they are dominated by portfolios with more stocks that give a lower shortfall probability and higher median terminal wealth.
An age-in-bonds strategy is often recommended by financial advisers but, historically at least, such a strategy would have given retirees inefficient bond-heavy portfolios, in that more stocks and less bonds would have reduced the shortfall probability and increased the median bequest.
Age-minus-25 and age-minus-35 strategies correct this problem, but the improvements over fixed stock-bond percentages are slight.
A flexible-spending strategy that adjusts the withdrawal rate as wealth fluctuates is a very appealing strategy in that it can substantially reduce the shortfall probability and increase the median bequest; the cost is reduced consumption when wealth declines. 
